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The European Central Bank has delegated its lender of
last resort duty to panicky bankers who are the slaves
of market sentiments. Pumping in over 1,000 billion
Euros this way has not stabilized Europe’s sovereign
debt markets.
Since December 2011 the European Central Bank (ECB) has pumped two waves
of extra liquidity into the European banking system, in an effort to keep it afloat –
and persuade backs to invest in sovereign debt. Yet Paul De Grauwe argues that
these banks are still wracked with uncertainty, which may lead to further sell-offs of
this debt – the very opposite of the ECB’s intent. The ECB could have avoided
much of the crisis by being a lender of last resort in direct support of Eurozone
governments with sovereign debt crises.
What can a trillion Euros buy these days? Not a lot if you are the European Central Bank (ECB),
which administers monetary policy for the 17 Eurozone member states. In December last year the
Bank injected massive amounts of liquidity into the Eurozone banking system, €489 billion. Then, at
the end of February this year the ECB created another €529 billion to help out the banking system.
There can be little doubt that these injections were necessary to prevent a liquidity squeeze from
bringing down the banking system.
As always when central banks use their ‘lender of last resort’ function one hears loud complaints that
these operations will lead to ‘moral hazard’ risk, i.e. that banks will have incentives to take on more
risk, preparing the road to the next crisis. This risk is real, yet should be set aside by the central
bank. In moments of crisis the central bank has to choose between two evils. The first one is an
imminent collapse of the banking system; the other one is the evil of future moral hazard. A
responsible central bank will always want to avoid the first evil.
While the lender of last resort operations of the ECB were necessary and helped to stabilize the
government bond markets in the Eurozone, they were also ill designed. The bad design of these
operations also explains why the ECB was forced to throw hundreds of billions of euros into the
banking system, thereby dramatically increasing its balance sheet.
What went wrong in the way the ECB designed its lender of last resort operations? It is important to
keep in mind that the present crisis in the Eurozone banking system is almost exclusively caused by
the sovereign debt crisis that emerged in early 2010. After the Greek debacle, exposing the
insolvency of the Greek sovereign, investors were caught by panic and started to sell the sovereign
bonds of other ‘peripheral’ countries in the Eurozone. I would argue that these countries were
solvent, but were caught in a liquidity crisis by the massive bond sales which led to a collapse of
bond prices and sky-high interest rates. Since most of the sovereign bonds were held by Eurozone
banks, the sovereign debt crisis turned into a banking crisis. 
The response of the ECB at that time
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The response of the ECB at that time
should have been to provide liquidity
support in the secondary markets of
sovereign bonds, so as to put a floor on the
prices of these bonds. The guiding principle
of the ECB should have been to provide
lender of last resort support to governments
that the Bank deemed to be solvent, but
illiquid. Clearly this would have excluded
Greece, but not countries like Ireland, Italy,
Spain and Portugal. A clear commitment by
the ECB that it would not tolerate a price
decline below a certain level would have
prevented the massive price declines of the
sovereign bonds of the latter countries. It
would also have prevented the banking
crisis. There can be little doubt that the ECB
had the capacity to put a floor on the bond
prices, and that the sheer trust in the
markets that the Bank could achieve this
would have made it possible for the ECB to reach this result with minimal use of money creation.
The ECB chose not to do so. The arguments that were used to justify inaction are the same one
hears today after the massive support of the banking system, i.e. moral hazard and inflation risk.
Only now, I would suggest, these arguments carry more weight because the intervention is so much
more massive today than if the ECB had intervened earlier in the government bond markets.
It is in this sense that the lender of last resort activities have been ill-designed. Instead of intervening
at the source of the problem (that is, the sovereign bond markets) the European Central Bank
allowed the crisis to become a banking crisis. And when the latter effect emerged, ECB decided to
delegate the power to buy government bonds to the banks, trusting that the latter would show the
right judgment to buy these bonds. But the banks themselves were and are still in a state of fear and
panic, and their judgment should not be trusted.
The unhappy decision of the ECB to delegate the decision to buy government bonds to panicky
bankers has had two unfortunate consequences. The first consequence was that the banks
channeled only a fraction of the liquidity they obtained from the ECB into the government bond
markets. As a result, the ECB had to pour much more liquidity into the system than if it had decided
to intervene itself in the government bond markets. As an example, if the banks used only half of the
liquidity to buy government bonds, the ECB had to create two euros to make sure one euro would
find its way into the sovereign bond market. This would be a very ineffective policy.
Secondly, and possibly even more important, as the liquidity support in the sovereign debt markets
now depends on the judgment of bankers who have not yet liberated themselves from fear and
panic, doubts continue to exist as to the continuing liquidity support that these bankers will provide.
New waves of panic may grip the bankers again, leading them to massively sell government bonds.
The risk that this may happen undermines the credibility of the whole operation, and can quickly
lead to a new crisis in the government bond markets.
It is quite unfortunate that the ECB has delegated its lender of last resort duty to bankers who
themselves are the slaves of market sentiments. In doing so, doubts continue to exist as to the
stability of the sovereign debt markets in the Eurozone. These doubts can only go away when the
ECB takes over the lead position and intervenes directly in the sovereign bond markets.
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